Strand space is often used to analyze the secure protocols. However, the protocol consistency conditions defined by strand space do not satisfy the characteristics ofAd Hoc routing protocol. Based on the characteristics of Ad Hoc mobile network, the thesis re-defines the consistency conditions for the normal operation of the protocol and at the same time adds intermediator credibility condition, thus adapts the strand space method to the security analysis for Ad Hoc routing protocols. The SRP protocol is taken as an example for the analysis of its security, and accordingly valuable results have been obtained.
Basic Concepts of Strand Spacel1
Strand space is a two-tuple (Z,tr), of which Y is the aggregate of a strand. The "strand" here can be used to represent any sequence, and "tr" represents a mapping of the sequence formed by elements from Y to A (aggregate of information that may be exchanged by participants during the operation of the protocol). The following are some basic concepts of strand space:
For a Sequence A, if its elements are messages that the protocol is to send, then such elements of A are called terms.
Sub-term: tO c tl means that tO is the sub-term of tl. Definition 1:for a two-tuple <c3,a>, of which a E A, c3 is + or -, usually written as +t or -t, then (±A)is a finite sequence of signed terms.
Definition 2:the strand space on A is defined as the trace of Sequence Y, denoted as 3-(±A).
In strand space, the Strand Z, and not trace, is often used to directly represent the strand space. The two should be distinguished when to indicate different instances resulted from the same trace. Definition 3:
1)A Node n represents a binary pair <s,i>, of which "s" is an element of Z, "i" is the serial number of the node in this strand. Each node belongs to a unique strand, and the aggregate of the nodes is denoted as N.
2) If nl, n2E &N, then definition nl->n2 represents nl=+a, n2=-a, i.e. Message a is transmitted from nl to n2.
3) If nl, n2EN, then definition nl=>n2 represents that nl and n2 are on the same strand, and n2 is the next node to nl. 4) For a Term t produced on Node n, if and only if Node n is positive and t c term(n), then for Node n' before any Node n, t ¢ term(n').
5) If and only if a Term t generates from a unique Node n, that Term t is called to generate from the unique Node n, e.g. a random number or timestamp.
6) Suppose I is the aggregate of unsigned term, Node n E N is an ingress node of I, if and only if term(n) = +a, (t & I), then for Node nI before any Node n, term (ni) X I.
7) For a Term t that ends at Node n, if and only if
Node n is negative and t ' term(n), then for Node nI after any Node n, term t ¢ term(n'). 
Attacker's Capability
Strand space theory establishes an attacker behavior model which makes formalized descriptions of some basic attacks. The capability of the attacker is mainly defined by the following two factors, i.e. the encrypted key set possessed by the attacker, and the capability of the attacker to generate new messages from the message it has received, of which such cryptographic key set is denoted as kp. The basic behavior of the attacker is described by the aggregate of the following traces of such attacker:
M :<+t>, send message. F :<-t>, receive message. T :<-g +g +g>, forward message after having received such message.
C:<-g -h +gh>, send Message gh after having received Message g and h.
S:<-gh +g +h>, respectively send Message g and h after having received Message gh.
K:<+k>, encrypted Key k.
E:<-k -h +th}k>, encrypt with encrypted Key k after having received Message h, and send the encrypted message.
D:<-k-1 -th}k +h>, receive encrypted message th}k and decrypt with private key, then send Message h. The attack on a certain protocol can be regarded as the aggregate of the basic behaviors mentioned above. These traces of the attackers give a formalized description of their capability, and at the same time ensure that the messages initiated from the attackers is closed for the calculation in the free message space.
Protocol Correctness Condition
In strand space, there are two levels of protocol consistency condition: I)Strong consistency condition: The protocol ensures that Participant B(respondent) agrees with a certain data item X. Each time when B as the respondent uses such data X to complete a round of protocol execution with A who is regarded by B as the initiator, there is indeed a unique round of protocol execution of which A as the initiator also uses X and thinks its respondent is B.
2) Weak consistency condition: Each time when B as the respondent uses such data X to complete a round of protocol execution with A who is regarded by B as the initiator, there is indeed a unique round of protocol execution of which A as the initiator also uses X and thinks its respondent is B.
The difference between strong and weak consistency is that the weak consistency does not guarantee the uniqueness of protocol execution. It cannot prevent A from executing multiple rounds of protocol that corresponds to B while B only executes one round. The same condition also applies to the initiator.
Improvement of Strand Space
In strand space, two roles are defined corresponding to the consistency attribute, i.e. the initiator and the respondent. This definition of roles is adaptive to wired network. However, owing to the special characteristics of mobile Ad Hoc network, if we use strand space in routing protocol security analysis of the Ad Hoc mobile network, we shall find there is large defects in such role definition.
Because Ad Hoc is a kind of multi-hop mobile network, communication between the initiator and respondent must be realized through relay of intermediate nodes. Thus there shall exist this situation that the initiator and respondent is unique, but there are vicious ones among the intermediate nodes, which are considered to be unsafe in routing protocol security analysis of the mobile Ad Hoc network, but at the same time deemed to still satisfy relevant conditions by strand space analysis. The reason thereof is that a new role, i.e. the intermediate nodes, appears in the routing protocol of mobile Ad Hoc network, which we shall call the intermediator. This role has been neglected in the original conditions, so the results of analysis fail to conform to reality.
On the other hand, during the process of route discovery, the initiator usually broadcasts by flooding, i.e. the initiator inquires all the nodes of the route to the destination node. Because there might be many routes between the initiator and the respondent, the respondent may receive many route requests for a single round of execution of the initiator, i.e. the respondent executes many rounds, which does not satisfy the consistency requirement.
Therefore considering the characteristics of mobile Ad Hoc network, the conditions must be re-defined when we are to use strand space theory in routing protocol security analysis. Because strong consistency condition is not satisfied in normal operation of mobile Ad Hoc network routing protocol, so we only keep weak consistency condition. At the same time for the new role-the intermediator, we propose that the protocol should satisfy the intermediator credibility condition, which is described in detail as follows:
Consistency Condition: Each time when B as the respondent uses data X to complete a round of protocol execution with A who is regarded by B as the initiator, there is indeed a unique round of protocol execution of which A as the initiator also uses X and thinks its respondent is B (this is called Respondent Guarantee). Accordingly, each time when A as the initiator uses data X to complete a round of protocol execution with B not. The non-mail traffic and intentional emails will be returned to the network driver and complete the transmission. If the outgoing mail is deemed unintentional, a log will be created and the message is discarded. Variations of the unintentional message processing are also possible. For example, the message can be held pending further user confirmation.
The proposed MISA algorithm can also be implemented as an extension to conventional host-based intrusion protection systems (HIPS) to combat spam. MISA algorithm satisfies HIPS' general requirements: * Must be able to block malicious code actions * Must not disrupt normal operations * Must be able to know the difference between attack events and normal events * Must be able to stop previously unknown attacks * Must protect flaws in permitted applications Cisco Security Agent (CSA) [9] is a possible example of a seamless integration between MISA and HIPS. CSA is an endpoint software package that protects server and desktop computing systems by * Intercept system calls between applications and the operating system * Apply kernel modifications that provide stringent security controls CSA intercepts requests to access key resources such as file system, network, packet, COM, registry, key system functions and inter-process communication calls. It is able to do keystroke logging, code injection, buffer overflow detection, memory modification, detection on network scans, and OS event log monitoring. The captured information can be used by MISA algorithm to determine the message intentability.
CSA also has the capability of taking real-time decision to allow or deny network traffic, query, change internal state, monitor. All these are done efficiently with little performance impact. A CSA extension can be built to combat spam by taking proper real-time actions based on previously determined message intentability.
Conclusion
Effective Spam control requires collaborative efforts from many elements of the Internet messaging system. We studied the spam control mechanisms that occur at the sender's user agent site. The intentability of an outgoing message is defined to distinguish a spam message from regular emails.
We propose a novel idea to correlate the user's physical machine interactions with the outgoing messages as a means to control spam generated from zombie systems. A simple algorithm, MISA, is proposed to calculate the intentability of the outgoing messages. Various actions can be taken, automatically or manually, to deal with spam messages.
The MISA algorithm is a supplementary mechanism to existing anti-spam methods. It can be implemented as an add-on to the conventional anti-virus and/or anti- Therefore nodes in the initiator strand cannot be from the attacker strand, and the initiator has indeed initiated a round of execution of the protocol, thus the proposition is proved.
Similarly we can prove that the protocol also satisfies initiator guarantee, therefore the protocol satisfies the consistency condition. From above we can see that the protocol does not satisfy the intermediator credibility condition, and we can obtain the following route of attack, where P represents the attacker:
From this we can see that the attacker can pretend to be the intermediator and complete a round of execution of the protocol. In this process the source node communicates with the destination node through route that include attacker nodes, which will result in disclose of information or malign packet loss. The main reason thereof is that the SRP protocol has no authentication From the above analysis we can see that the improved strand space method can be used to analyze the security of Ad Hoc routing protocol. Basing on the attacker model, the strand space method describes the basic behaviors of the attacker, therefore from the point of the attacker, this method can find out the concrete route of attack as well as the defects or flaws in the protocol, thus provides a definite guide to the protocol designers, who in turn can know the reason of such protocol defects and accordingly make improvements. [5] However, this method is based on the attacker model, thus the result of the analysis totally relies on the description of the attacker's behavior. On one hand, it is not certain that such attacker model can describe all the attack behaviors; on the other hand, the method cannot prove the security of the protocols, i.e. if the method can find out the defects, this can only show that such protocol is not secure; even if no defect is found, we still cannot say that such protocol is secure.
